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Casenote

Signed, Your Coach: Restricting Speech in
Athletic Recruiting in Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Academy

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Academy
("Brentwood I/,), 1 the United States Supreme Court unanimously held
that an athletic association may enforce its anti-undue-influence
recruiting policy, restricting the speech of its voluntary member schools,
to avoid undue influence on young student athletes during the recruitment process.2 In reaching its holding, the Court extended two lines of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, the Court extended the
application of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 3 to a context other than
attorney-client solicitation for the first time.4 In doing so, the Court
held that the possibility of undue influence in athletic recruiting was
analogous to that in attorney-client solicitation and harmful enough to

1.
2.
3.
4.

127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
Id. at 2496.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
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justify speech restriction.' Second, the Court extended the application
of the Pickering v. Board of Education6 balancing test beyond the
context of government employment, weighing the interests of Brentwood
Academy ("Brentwood") against those of the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association ("TSSAA"). 7 Ultimately, the Court held that the
TSSAA's interest in enforcing its rules and restricting the speech of its
voluntary members outweighed Brentwood's interest in recruiting
speech.'
The decision in Brentwood II sets a precarious standard. The First
Amendment doctrines used by the Court to support its holding were
removed from their contexts and greatly extended. While the decision
in Brentwood II is unanimous, the concurring Justices did not concur in
the judgment because they supported the reasoning adopted by the
majority. Rather, the concurring Justices in Brentwood II did so for the
same reasons that they dissented in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass'n ("Brentwood I"),9 arguing that Brentwood was not entitled to First Amendment protection because TSSAA's
actions were private and not state actions.'0
Further, the Court
established a nebulous practical standard for recruiting that does little
to clarify the boundary between appropriate recruiting measures and
inappropriate ones.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The TSSAA is a not-for-profit corporation that provides standards,
rules, and regulations for interscholastic athletics among its members.
Membership is voluntary and includes approximately 290 public high
schools and 55 private high schools in the state of Tennessee. Brentwood is one of the private school members."
Since the 1950s, the TSSAA has maintained a policy that prohibits
high schools from imposing "undue influence" on middle school studentathletes in the process of recruiting for high school athletics. In April
1997 the head football coach at Brentwood mailed letters to a number
of eighth-grade football players who had signed letters of intent, which
are contracts indicating their intent to attend and play football at

5. Id.
6.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).

7.
8.

Brentwood H, 127 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
Id. at 2495-96.

9.

531 U.S. 288 (2001).

10. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2492
(2007).
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Brentwood. The letters from the football coach, which were also sent to
the parents of the student athletes, invited the student athletes to the
school's spring football practice sessions. 2 The letters also informed
the rising freshmen that equipment would be distributed at these
practices and that "getting involved as soon as possible would definitely
be to [their] advantage."13 The letter was signed "Your Coach." 4 All
of the recipients of the letter attended all or some of the spring
practices. 5
The TSSAA declared the letters violative of the TSSAA anti-undueinfluence recruiting policy, which led to an investigation of recruiting
practices at the school by a three-member panel known as the TSSAA
Board of Control. During this investigation, Brentwood was given ample
notice that it had violated the TSSAA anti-undue-influence recruiting
policy. Regular correspondence and meetings between TSSAA and
Brentwood regarding the investigation ensued. This correspondence
included a hearing before the TSSAA Board of Control and a de novo
review by the entire TSSAA board of directors. At these proceedings, the
school was represented by counsel and given the chance to introduce
evidence to both of the boards, but each time, the school elected not to
present evidence. As a result of these hearings, the TSSAA Board of
Control found that Brentwood violated TSSAA's policy prohibiting
undue-influence in the recruiting of student-athletes and sanctioned
Brentwood accordingly. The board placed Brentwood's athletic program
on a four-year probation, prohibited the Brentwood boys' football and
basketball teams from competing in playoff tournaments for two years,
and fined the school $3,000.'6
In 1998 after the TSSAA enforcement proceedings, Brentwood brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee against the TSSAA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," challenging
the athletic association's prohibition of undue-influence recruitment of
middle school students for athletic programs. Brentwood alleged that
the TSSAA's sanctions were state actions that violated the school's First
Amendment 8 and Fourteenth Amendment' 9 rights. The district court

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 293 (2001).
Brentwood 11, 127 S. Ct. at 2492 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2496-97.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V.
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entered summaryjudgment for Brentwood on its First Amendment claim
and enjoined the TSSAA from enforcing its anti-recruiting policy.2 °
On appeal, the TSSAA alleged the district court erred in holding that
the TSSAA's actions constituted state actions. 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court, holding that the actions of the TSSAA did not constitute
state actions but instead constituted private actions from which
Brentwood was not protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendments.22
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
ruling of the Sixth Circuit, holding that the TSSAA was a state actor. 3
In so holding, the Court stated that the TSSAA met the entwinement
exception to the state action doctrine. 24 The Court reasoned that state
government was entwined in the operations of the TSSAA from the
"bottom up" and the "top down," which rendered the nominally private
entity a state actor.25 The state government was entwined from the
bottom up because 84% of the TSSAA's members were public schools in
which athletics played a vital role in student education.28 In addition,
half of the TSSAA meetings were at public schools during regular school
hours, and the financial support for the TSSAA came from the member
schools. 27 Regarding top-down entwinement, the Court held that state
employees were selected to serve as members of the TSSAA's Board of
Control, and the TSSAA!s ministerial employees were treated as state
employees for state retirement benefits.2 8 Having resolved the state
action issue, the Court remanded the case for adjudication on the First
and Fourteenth Amendment claims.29
On remand, the Sixth Circuit held that the TSSAA's policy did not
facially violate Brentwood's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
and the case was further remanded to the district court for trial on those
claims. 30 The district court ruled for Brentwood again, finding the
school's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the
TSSAA's enforcement of its recruiting policy. An appeal followed, and

20.
21.
1999).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 293.
BrentwoodAcad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758,761 (6th Cir.
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 305.
Brentwood 11, 127 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
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the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court, holding that Brentwood's free speech rights were
violated."' Granting certiorari a second time, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed and remanded the case, holding that: (1) the
TSSAA's enforcement of its anti-undue-influence recruiting policy did not
violate Brentwood's First Amendment rights and (2) any procedural due
process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment regarding the
TSSAA proceedings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 2
III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The FirstAmendment, FourteenthAmendment, and Incorporation

The First Amendment 3 provides, in relevant part, that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'
Over the
years, the Supreme Court has extended the First Amendment to apply
to the Federal judicial and executive branches in addition to the United
States Congress. However, the Court has extended the First Amendment's protection further. The Fourteenth Amendment3 5 provides, in
relevant part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
36
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
Because freedom of speech is a privilege of citizenship of the United
States, the Court has interpreted this clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to broaden the protection of the First Amendment and
protect individuals from the speech restrictions of state actors in addition
to federal actors.
This doctrine is known as incorporation and has
been used by the Court to protect most of the individual liberties granted
by the Bill of Rights from state action in addition to federal action."
The Court has chosen not to extend the First Amendment further and
has adopted the state action doctrine, establishing that the First
Amendment's protection does not extend to the actions of other
individuals or private entities.39 However, there are some judicially
created exceptions to this general rule in which the actions of private
entities are considered to be state action. For example, the Court has

31. Id.
32. Id. at 2495-96, 2497-98.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36. Id. § 1 (the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
37. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
38. Id. at 148.
39. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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held that a private entity should be treated as a state actor "when it is
controlled by an 'agency of the State,' when it has been delegated a
public function by the State, when it is 'entwined with governmental
policies,' or when government is 'entwined in [its] management or
control. "'' 4 When a nominally private entity's composition and workings are pervaded by public institutions and officials, it is appropriate
to apply constitutional standards to that entity.4 The Court recognized
this concept in Evans v. Newton,4 2 in which the Court held that
"[c]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with
governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character
as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state
action."43
B. When Are Restrictions on Speech Acceptable?
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed First Amendment free speech in the context of athletic recruiting, the Court does
recognize two long-standing doctrines regarding permissible government
speech restriction.44 Each doctrine provides an example of when it is
acceptable by First Amendment standards to restrict the speech of a
private entity because society's interest 45in restricting the speech
outweighs society's interest in protecting it.

1. Ohralik and Undue Influence. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n,46 the Court held that a state agency may prohibit an attorney
from engaging in face-to-face solicitation of clients due to the potential
dangers such solicitation may precipitate.47 Ohralik, a member of the
Ohio Bar, learned of a car accident in which one of the victims was a
casual acquaintance. Immediately afterward, Ohralik visited the victim
in the hospital while the young lady was still in traction in her hospital
bed. The two talked briefly about the car accident, and then Ohralik
told the victim that he would represent her and asked her to sign a
contract, which she did at a later date. On the same day, Ohralik
solicited an eighteen-year-old female passenger injured in the same

40. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)
(brackets in original) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 298.
42. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
43. Id. at 299.
44. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
45. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563.
46. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
47. Id. at 468.
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accident, who verbally committed to retain him. Later, the victims filed
a complaint with the local bar association regarding Ohralik's conduct,
and the complaint was related to the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio.4" The board
had long held that "direct, in-person communication with the prospective
client ... [is] inconsistent with the [legal] profession's ideal of the

attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for
harm to the prospective client."49 As a result, the board found that
Ohralik had violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility ° and
sanctioned him accordingly. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the
board's findings and enforced the sanctions, despite Ohralik's allegations
that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. 1 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Ohio
Supreme Court's ruling.52
On Ohralik's claims of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations,
the Court held that restricting such speech was of greater societal
interest than preserving it, reasoning that "in-person solicitation may
exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without
providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection." 3 In so concluding, the Court considered the immediacy of the communication and the
imminence of harm that could be caused by the communication. 4 The
unanimous opinion, written by Justice Powell, identified several dangers
that could result from in-person solicitation, including a one-sided
presentation of the facts by the attorney, a hastily made decision by the
potential client who has no time to reflect and compare, and the absence
of an opportunity for a third party to intervene and offer alternatives.5"
The Court stressed that an attorney, trained in the art of persuasion,
putting such pressures on a potential client "actually may disserve the
individual and societal interest ...in facilitating 'informed and reliable
decisionmaking.'" 56 Because that societal interest of preventing undue
influence was a compelling interest of the state, the state had the
authority to restrict speech to protect that interest. 7

48.

Id. at 450-54.

49. Id. at 454.
50.
51.
52.
53.

OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR2-103(A), -104(A) (1970).
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 457.

54. Id. at 457 n.13.
55. Id. at 457.
56. Id. at 458 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
57.

Id. at 462.
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The Court's rationale included two major considerations: (1) the
injurious effects of in-person client solicitation on the legal profession
and (2) the injurious effects, potential or actual, that such solicitation
could have on a potential client.5" In the second part of its rationale,
the Court articulated that a lay client may be unsophisticated and
distressed and may have placed a great amount of trust in the lawyer
in response to the vulnerability of, and the pressures placed upon, the
client.5 9 In contrast to in-person solicitation, when a potential client
reads an advertisement or information in writing, the client has time to
bombardment of [his]
reflect and can "'effectively avoid further
60
eyes.'"
[his]
averting
by
simply
sensibilities
Ohralik has become the standard for attorney-client solicitation.
However, due to the unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers,
the Court had not extended the 1978 holding beyond the attorney-client
relationship until Brentwood 11.61

2. Pickering and Balancing of Interests The Court also has
allowed the restriction of government employee speech by the government as employer in limited situations.62 In Pickering v. Board of
6 3 which was later refined by Connick v. Myers' and a
Education,
multitude of other cases, the Court established a four-prong test for
determining when the government as employer may restrict the speech
of its employees.'
In Pickeringan Illinois high school teacher, Pickering, was dismissed
by the local board of education. The board dismissed Pickering for
sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the way the board and
its superintendent handled proposals for increased taxes that would
raise revenue for schools. Pickering challenged his dismissal, arguing
his letter was free speech protected by the First and Fourteenth
However, after a full hearing, the board determined
Amendments.
his letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration
of the schools of the district" and upheld his dismissal.6" Pickering

58. Id. at 460-66.
59. Id. at 465.
60. Id. at 466 n.25 (brackets in original) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971)).
61. 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2498 (2007).
62. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
63. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
64. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
65. See id.
66. Pickering,391 U.S. at 564.
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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filed suit in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, which affirmed the
board's dismissal, stating that the interests of the school system in
efficient education of students outweighed Pickering's First Amendment
interest in the speech at issue. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court's ruling, and Pickering appealed to the United
States Supreme Court for adjudication on his First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges."
In a unanimous opinion, written by Justice Marshall, the Court held
that Pickering's speech was not detrimental to the efficient education of
students.69
Therefore, Pickering's First Amendment interest in
speaking on issues of public importance outweighed the board's interest
in efficiency, and his dismissal violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.70 In arriving at its holding, the Court identified factors
for courts to use when assessing whether an employee's speech disrupts
the efficient performance of government.7 1 These factors indicate
whether the government employee's speech interests have overcome the
government employer's interest in efficiency and, in turn, reveal whether
the employee's dismissal was lawful or in violation of the employee's free
speech rights.72
A court using the four-prong Pickering-Connick test must first
consider the threshold inquiry of whether the employee's speech touched
on matters of public concern.7" Government employee speech touches
on matters of public concern when the employee is speaking as a private
citizen, not as an employee pursuant to official duties, and when the
speech addresses issues of political, social, or other matters of interest
to the public.74 When speech touches on matters of public concern, it
is deemed protected speech for First Amendment purposes. 5 Second,
if the employee speech satisfies that threshold, a court must consider
whether the government's interest in efficient performance of public
services outweighs the employee's First Amendment interest in the
speech at issue.76 In balancing the two interests, a court must determine whether the speech impaired the government's ability to perform
its duties, which includes an evaluation of any impairment of workplace
harmony or discipline, impairment of working relationships, and
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 565.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 569-73.
Id.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
Id.
Id.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
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impairment of the speaker's ability to perform his or her own duties
effectively.77 In addition, a court must assess any disruption resulting
from the manner, time, place, and context of the speech.78 A potential
disruption is all that is required for the government's interests to
outweigh the employee's interests and, thus, for speech restriction to be
lawful.7 9 Third, a court must consider whether the government
employee's speech played a substantial role in the termination.80
Finally, if after considering the first three prongs, the court determines
the employee's speech was protected speech, then the burden of proof
shifts to the government to prove the government employee would have
been fired regardless of the speech.8'
If any one of the four prongs of the Pickering-Connick analysis is
resolved in favor of the government employer, then a court need not
proceed to the next prong in the sequence, and that court must hold that
the government was justified in its restriction of employee speech. 2
However, if all prongs of the analysis are resolved in favor of the
government employee, then the speech restriction is held to be a First
Amendment violation.'
D. ProceduralDue Process Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall... deprive4
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."8
Due process is divided into two varieties: procedural due process and
substantive due process." Procedural due process dictates that when
a state or federal government deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property, it must follow appropriate procedures.8 6 Substantive due
process refers to protecting those substantive rights to life, liberty, and
property.8 7 In assessing procedural due process, the Supreme Court
considers: (1) whether there has been a deprivation, (2) whether the
deprivation is of life, liberty, or property, and (3) whether proper
procedures were followed, considering the private interest affected by the
government action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights, and the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 570-73.
Id.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).
Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-55.
See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
See id.
See id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 901 (1998 & Supp. 2007).
Id.
Id.
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government's interest in the deprivation."8 However, when a due
process violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, recovery is not
available to a claimant.89
IV.

COURTS RATIONALE

The Court in Brentwood 1190 identified two issues posed by the case:
(1) whether the TSSAA!s enforcement of its anti-undue-influence
recruiting policy violated Brentwood's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights and (2) whether the TSSAA proceedings violated Brentwood's
procedural due process rights.91 Correspondingly, the Court's analysis
was divided into two sections mirroring the two issues, but the Court's
opinion was dominated by analysis of the first issue.
A.

Undue Influence Existed
First, the Court identified a difference between communication with
the public at large and communication that is direct, personalized, and
in a "coercive setting.""
To illustrate that point, Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, cited Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,93 which
held that an attorney's in-person solicitation of a vulnerable client was
not protected by the First Amendment as commercial speech.9
In
Brentwood 11, the Court held that the same evils that distinguished inperson solicitation of a client by an attorney from commercial speech
existed when a high school football coach wrote a letter to a rising ninth
grader.9 5 Justice Stevens specifically noted two aspects of the recruiting letters that were particularly liable to cause undue pressure.96
Those aspects were: (1) the letter being signed, "Your Coach," and (2) the
fact that the statement "getting involved as soon as possible would
definitely be to your advantage" may suggest to the young student
athlete that involvement may not be optional and failure to do so may
be detrimental to the student athlete's athletic career.97 Because of the
ability of those statements to exert pressure on the student athletes and

88. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89. See 16B AM. JR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 906 (1998 & Supp. 2007).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
Id. at 2492.
Id. at 2493.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Id. at 468.

95. Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
96. Id. at 2495.
97. Id. at 2495 & n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"short circuit" informed decision-making, the Court held the letters from
the Brentwood coach were not protected by the First Amendment.98
B. Efficiency of TSSAA Operations Outweighed Brentwood's Interest
in Free Speech
Second, the Court concluded that Brentwood chose to be a member of
the TSSAA, and just as a government office may restrict speech to
preserve efficient and effective performance of public duties, so too may
a voluntary athletic association restrict speech when, like the TSSAA,
that athletic association has been deemed a state actor.99 The Court
assumed, without deciding, that Brentwood's speech touched on matters
of public concern and then applied the Pickering-Connick balancing
test.100 Because the recruiting letters from Brentwood's football coach
"could lead to exploitation, distort competition between high school
teams, and foster an environment in which athletics are prized more
highly than academics," the Court reasoned that common sense dictated
that those negative effects impaired the TSSAA's ability to operate
effectively and carry out its mission.' 1 Therefore, the Court held that
the TSSAA's interest in preventing undue-influence recruiting outweighed Brentwood's interest in the speech at issue, rendering the
restriction of the speech legitimate."°2
C. Any Due Process Violation Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt
In a laconic third section of the opinion, the Court held that if
Brentwood's procedural due process rights had been violated, which the
Court suggested was unlikely, the violation was harmless beyond a
0 3
reasonable doubt."
The Court noted that the TSSAA's sanctioning of
Brentwood "was preceded by an investigation, several meetings,
exchanges of correspondence [including faxes, memoranda, and letters],
an adverse written determination from TSSAA's executive director, a
hearing before ... TSSAA's Board of Control, and finally a de novo
review by the entire TSSAA Board of Directors." °4 In addition, the
Court noted that during each hearing, Brentwood was represented by

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 2494-95.
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2495.
Id. at 2496.
Id.
Id. at 2497.
Id. at 2496.
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counsel and had the opportunity to present evidence but did not do
so. 10 5 Brentwood argued that it was not allowed to cross-examine or
review the notes of the investigators during the hearings and that it was
prejudiced as a result."° However, the Court held that Brentwood's
assertion that it would have taken a different, more effective approach
had it not been so prejudiced was unsupported, and the Court noted that
Brentwood never suggested how it was prejudiced or how its approach
would have been different. °7 As a result, the Court concluded that
even if Brentwood's shaky assertion of prejudice was true, it still would
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Brentwood never
identified any actual harm.'
D.

The Concurring Opinions
The first concurring opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, who
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment and was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito.' °9
Here,
Justice Kennedy took issue with the application of Ohralik to the facts
of Brentwood II (Justice Thomas joined this part of Justice Kennedy's
opinion as well)." ° Justice Kennedy stated that Ohralik had never
been extended beyond the attorney-client relationship and, due to the
particular features of attorney-client solicitation, should not have been
extended to other forms of personal solicitation."' In addition, Justice
Kennedy argued that the majority's application of Ohralik made
immaterial whether TSSAA membership was voluntary or mandatory,
suggesting that when a school volunteered to be a member of an athletic
association, it was volunteering to abide by all the rules thereof, no
matter what those rules were." 2 Justice Kennedy aptly noted that the
actual majority of the Court (five Justices) agreed with the inapplicability of Ohralik."3
In Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, he primarily focused on the
second prong of the majority's analysis, the application of the Pickering-Connick balancing test."4 Justice Thomas stated that Pickering v.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 2497-98.
107. Id. at 2498.
108. Id.
109. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2498-99.
113. Id. at 2499.
114. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Board of Education"5 was taken out of its usual context of government
employment when it was applied to a nonemployment context involving
a private school and a private athletic association."' Instead of the
"bizarre exercise of extending obviously inapplicable First Amendment
doctrine to these circumstances," Justice Thomas suggested that the
Court simply should have overruled Brentwood I and held that the
TSSAA was not a state actor, which would render a holding on First
Amendment violations unnecessary."7
Finally, Justice Thomas
agreed, without elaborating, with Justice Kennedy's opinion that Ohralik
was not applicable to this case, and its application by the majority was
"outright wrong."" 8
V. IMPLICATIONS
It is no surprise that the Justices who wrote or joined concurring
opinions in Brentwood II, with the addition of Justice Alito, were the
same Justices who dissented in Brentwood I. In Brentwood I, those
Justices contended that the actions of the TSSAA should not have been
considered state actions and therefore would not fall under the purview
of the First Amendment." 9 Six years later, in Brentwood II, the same
Justices still agreed the First Amendment did not protect Brentwood. 2 ° However, those Justices did not so assert because they agreed
with the majority's reasoning in Brentwood 11.121
Five Justices out of nine in Brentwood II believed the Ohralik and
Pickering-Connick standards did not apply to Brentwood and the
TSSAA, and yet these Justices concurred in the judgment because they
still did not believe the TSSAAs actions were state actions. 22 Indeed,
Justice Thomas's dissent correctly stated that the majority's application
of Ohralik to Brentwood and the TSSAA was "outright wrong. " 123 For
example, the recruiting letter at issue was a written, not an in-person
communication, giving the student athletes a chance to reflect."2 In
addition, the letter was sent to the student athletes and their parents,
giving their parents a chance to intervene. 25 Oddly, though, this was

115.
116.
117.
118.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2499 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id.

119.
120.

531 U.S. 288, 305-15 (2001).
127 S. Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

121. Id.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 2498 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2499 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 2492 (majority opinion).
See Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 293.
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never mentioned in Brentwood II but only mentioned in Brentwood
.16 With the majority opinion being supported by authority that has
been stretched and massaged to the point of inapplicability and with the
actual majority of the members of the Court opposing the application of
that authority, the reasoning in Brentwood II teeters precariously and
likely will not withstand future challenges.
Second, the standard for acceptable recruiting practices established by
the opinion in Brentwood II is too vague to be followed in practice. The
Court's opinion raises more questions about the boundaries of recruiting
than it answers. The application of Ohralik would have been more
appropriate if the purpose of the recruiting letter was to solicit the
student athletes' signatures on contractual letters of intent. In this case,
however, the student athletes had already signed those letters,
contractually indicating their intent to attend and play football at
Brentwood. 2 ' So at the point when the student athletes received the
letters, the Brentwood coach was their coach. In addition, as the Court
pointed out, the student athletes may not have interpreted the invitation
to get involved as optional, but perhaps that involvement was not, in
28
fact, optional if they wished to be a part of the football program.
But if not at that point in the recruiting process, when may a coach
invite rising freshmen to get involved? When may a coach warmly close
a letter by signing, "Your Coach?" What type of correspondence should
a coach have with recruits and their parents? These questions remain
unanswered. Given the importance of athletics in the United States and
the recent national spotlight on illegal and unethical practices in
athletics, the Court will likely return to the reasoning in Brentwood II
to help answer those questions.
BRIAN CRADDOCK

126. See id.
127. Brentwood II, 127 S. Ct. at 2492.
128. See id.

